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THE CORE LOGIC PARADOX
Joseph Vidal-Rosset
Abstract. — This paper provides a proof that Tennant’s logical system en-
tails a paradox that is called “Core logic paradox”, in reference to the new
name given by Tennant to his intuitionistic relevant logic [2, 3]. The incon-
sistency theorem on which this paper ends is preceded by lemmas that prove
syntactically and semantically that rule L⊤ is strongly admissible in the se-
quent calculus for propositional Core logic. This rule plays a key role in a
consistency test on which Tennant’s logical system fails.
1. Two basic claims of Core logic
The idiosyncrasy of Tennant’s logical system lies mainly in this pair of
claims:
(1) The First Lewis Paradox that is the sequent ¬A, A ⊢ B is not provable
in Core logic, therefore the formula
¬A, A 0 B (1)
is claimed as being valid in Core logic.(1)
(1)Tennant [5, page 195] wrote ¬A, A 2 B, because of the completeness claimed for Core
logic, formula (1) is justified.
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(2) Every intuitionistic logical theorem is provable in Core logic, therefore
⊢ ¬A → (A → B) (2)
is provable in Core logic.
The slogan “relevance at the level of the turnstile” [5, p. 15, p. 41, p. 121,
p. 263] explains this surprising feature of Tennant’s logical system.
The proofs of lemmas and theorem given in the next section are based on
the following rules of sequent calculus for propositional Core logic.
Table 1. Rules of sequent calculus for propositional Core logic [5]
Ax.
A ⊢ A
∆ ⊢ A
L¬
¬A,∆ ⊢
A,∆ ⊢
R¬
∆ ⊢ ¬A
∆ ⊢ C
L∧
A ∧B,∆\{A, B} ⊢ C
where ∆ ∩ {A, B} 6= ∅
∆ ⊢ A Γ ⊢ B
R∧
∆,Γ ⊢ A ∧B
A,∆ ⊢ C/⊥ B,Γ ⊢ C/⊥
L∨
A ∨B,∆,Γ ⊢ C/⊥
∆ ⊢ A
R∨
∆ ⊢ A ∨B
∆ ⊢ B
R∨
∆ ⊢ A ∨B
∆ ⊢ A B,Γ ⊢ C
L →
A → B,∆,Γ ⊢ C
A,∆ ⊢
R →(a)
∆ ⊢ A → B
∆ ⊢ B R →(b)
∆\{A} ⊢ A → B
2. Inconsistency Proof
Definition 2.1. — A = P ∪{¬,∨,∧,→}∪{), (}. A is the standard alphabet
for formulas of propositional Core logic, composed of P as set of proposi-
tional variables, of the usual set of connectives that are respectively negation,
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disjunction, conjunction, conditional and a set of round brackets. The sym-
bolism of sequent calculus for this logic is also standard: “Γ,∆” stand for sets
of formulas, and “⊢” is the usual symbol of syntactic inference.(2)
Definition 2.2. — ⊥ is not the absurdity constant but “merely a punctua-
tion device in proofs, used in order to register absurdity” [5, p. 266].
Definition 2.3. — ⊤ here stands for any theorem of Core propositional logic
and should not be read as the truth constant.
Lemma 2.4. — The equivalence ∆ ⊣⊢ ⊤ ∧∆ is provable “at the level of the
turnstile” in Core logic.
Proof. — Assume ⊤ = (A → A), then
Ax
A ⊢ A
⊢ A → A
Ax
∆ ⊢ ∆
R∧
∆ ⊢ (A → A) ∧∆
Ax
∆ ⊢ ∆
L∧
(A → A) ∧∆ ⊢ ∆
i.e.
Ax
∆ ⊢ ∆
W k.
A → A,∆ ⊢ ∆
Therefore, by induction on the structure of these derivations, the equiva-
lence
∆ ⊣⊢ ⊤ ∧∆
is proved in Core logic.(3)
(2)In this paper “⊢” is preferred instead of “:” used by Tennant, just because “0” is also
used.
(3)The rule of Weakening on the left is admissible in Core logic, but, to prevent the derivation
of the negated-conclusion version of the First Lewis Paradox i.e. ¬A, A ⊢ ¬B, Weakening
on the left is banned in this case:
¬A, A ⊢ ⊥
W k.
B,¬A, A ⊢ ⊥
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Lemma 2.5. — The following couple of rules L⊤ is strongly admissible(4)
in Core logic:
∆ ⊢ C
L⊤
⊤,∆ ⊢ C
∆ 0 C
L⊤
⊤,∆ 0 C
Proof. — {⊤,∆} and {∆} are equivalent (see the previous proof).
First proof by contradiction. — 1. Assume ∆ 0 C, therefore 0 ∆ → C and
therefore ¬(∆→ C) is satisfiable.
2. Assume ⊤,∆ ⊢ B, therefore ⊤ ∧∆ ⊢ B, therefore ⊢ (⊤ ∧∆) → C and
therefore (⊤ ∧∆)→ C is satisfiable.
3. Ax⊢ ⊤ is trivially admissible in any sequent calculus for propositional
logic.
4. The following derivation proves in propositional Core logic that the
conjunction of assumptions 1 and 2 is inconsistent, in other words unsatisfiable:
Ax
∆ ⊢ ∆
Ax
⊢ ⊤
R∧
∆ ⊢ ⊤ ∧∆
Ax
C ⊢ C
L →
∆, (⊤ ∧∆)→ C ⊢ C
R →
(⊤ ∧∆)→ C ⊢ ∆→ C
L¬
¬(∆→ C), (⊤ ∧∆)→ C ⊢
Second proof by contradiction. — 1. Assume ∆ ⊢ C, therefore ⊢ ∆ → C and
therefore ∆→ C is satisfiable.
(4) The rule
S
S′
is strongly admissible if and only if for every derivation of height n of an instance of S there
is a derivation of height ≤ n of the corresponding instance of S′[1, p. 1501]. Rules L⊤ are
strongly admissible according to this definition given by Dyckhoff and Negri [1, p. 1501],
and invertible, hence the double inference line.
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2. Assume ⊤,∆ 0 C, therefore ⊤ ∧∆ 0 C, therefore 0 (⊤ ∧∆) → C and
therefore ¬((⊤ ∧∆)→ C) is satisfiable.
3. The following derivation proves in propositional Core logic that the
conjunction of assumptions 1 and 2 is inconsistent, in other words unsatisfiable:
Ax
∆ ⊢ ∆
L∧
⊤ ∧∆ ⊢ ∆
Ax
C ⊢ C
L →
⊤ ∧∆,∆→ C ⊢ C
R →
∆→ C ⊢ (⊤ ∧∆)→ C
L¬
¬((⊤ ∧∆)→ C),∆→ C ⊢
Lemma 2.6. — Rules L⊤ in Core logic are sound:
∆ ⊢ C
L⊤
⊤,∆ ⊢ C
therefore ⊤,∆  C ⇔ ∆  C
∆ 0 C
L⊤
⊤,∆ 0 C
therefore ⊤,∆ 2 C ⇔ ∆ 2 C
Equivalence proof: ⊤,∆  C ⇔ ∆  C. — In Core logic semantics, like in
minimal logic’s, there are only three possible cases [4, pp. 758-762] that lead
all to the same conclusion:
1. Assume that C is a contradiction i.e. C = ⊥, then ⊤,∆  C is valid if
and only if ⊥ can be deduced from ∆, therefore ⊤,∆  C ⇔ ∆  C.
2. Assume that C is a theorem i.e. C = ⊤, by definition, ⊤,∆  C is
reducible to  C, therefore ⊤,∆  C ⇔ ∆  C,
3. Assume that C is neither a contradiction nor a tautology, but only a
satisfiable formula. In this case, ⊤,∆  C is valid if and only if C is deducible
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from ∆, therefore ⊤,∆  C ⇔ ∆  C.
Therefore, in Core logic, ⊤,∆  C ⇔ ∆  C.
Equivalence proof: ⊤,∆ 2 C ⇔ ∆ 2 C. — Again, there are only three possi-
ble cases that lead all to the same conclusion:
1. Assume that C is a contradiction i.e. C = ⊥. ⊤ 2 ⊥ is trivial: provided
the consistency of any deductive system S, the negation of a theorem in S is
always unprovable in S, therefore it is provable that ⊤,∆ 2 ⊥ if and only if
no contradiction is deducible from ∆, therefore ⊤,∆ 2 C ⇔ ∆ 2 C.
2. Assume that C is a theorem i.e. C = ⊤, then by definition the formula
2 C i.e. 2 ⊤ is always false and therefore ⊤,∆ 2 C ⇔ ∆ 2 C.
3. Assume that C is neither a contradiction nor a tautology, but only a
satisfiable formula. In this case, ⊤,∆ 2 C is provable if and only it is provable
that C is not deducible from ∆ because, again, it is trivial that ⊤ 2 C when
the truth value of C can be ⊥, therefore ⊤,∆ 2 C ⇔ ∆ 2 C.
Therefore, in Core logic, ⊤,∆ 2 C ⇔ ∆ 2 C.
Lemma 2.7. — In Core proofs, rules L⊤ must be written as follows
Ax
⊢ ⊤ ∆ ⊢ C
L⊤
⊤,∆ ⊢ C
Ax
⊢ ⊤ ∆ 0 C
L⊤
⊤,∆ 0 C
Reason. — Axiom Ax⊢ ⊤ is trivially admissible in any sequent calculus for
propositional logic. ⊤ and Ax⊢ ⊤ must be replaced respectively by the
mention of a theorem and its proof, symbol ⊤ being not used in Core logic.
Last, the double inference line is useless, the use and the reading of rule L⊤
being top-down.
Theorem 2.8. — Tennant’s propositional Core logic is inconsistent.
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Proof. — Here is a consistency test via rule L⊤ that leads to the addition of
theorem (2) on the left of sequent (1). Indeed, the following formula
¬A → (A → B),¬A, A 0 B (3)
is provable in Core logic, via this derivation D1 where the last rule is L⊤:
Ax
A ⊢ A
L¬
¬A, A ⊢
R →(a)
¬A ⊢ A → B
R →(b)
⊢ ¬A → (A → B) ¬A, A 0 B
L⊤
¬A → (A → B),¬A, A 0 B
But the trouble is that the sequent
¬A → (A → B),¬A, A ⊢ B (4)
is also provable in Core logic, via this derivation D2:
Ax
A ⊢ A
L¬
¬A, A ⊢
R¬
¬A ⊢ ¬A
Ax
A ⊢ A
Ax
B ⊢ B
L →
A → B, A ⊢ B
L →
¬A → (A → B),¬A, A ⊢ B
Therefore, a contradiction is derivable from propositional Core logic:
D1
...
¬A → (A → B),¬A, A 0 B
D2
...
¬A → (A → B),¬A, A ⊢ B
⊥
Consequently, according to the well-known definition of an inconsistent the-
ory,(5) Tennant’s propositional Core logic is inconsistent.
(5)A theory Σ is inconsistent if and only if a contradiction is deducible from Σ.
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